Understanding the behavior in collective action problems: behavioral and experimental approach
| Principal Investigator: | Ing. Jaromír KOVAŘÍK, Ph.D.| Project Number: | GA24-12255S | Grant awarded by: | GA ČR | |
| Term: | 2024-2026 |
CO-INVESTIGATORS:
PROJECT ANNOTATION:
This project analyzes experimentally and theoretically the behavior in collective action problems (CAPs). CAPs present a trade-off between the individual and social interest, but the only gametheoretical prediction is the “tragedy of the commons”. Since this tradeoff is present in many global challenges (including climate change, depletion of natural resources, or the spread of epidemic diseases), understanding the behavior in CAPs is of utmost interest across behavioral sciences. This project employs game theory, experimental economics, and network theory in order to analyze:
(i) individual influence and its perception in these situations,
(ii) whether cooperation in dynamic CAPs can be sustained under two conditions:
(a) when the degree of success sustaining cooperation in one period determines whether the game continues to the next period and
(b) under manipulable reputation, and
(iii) to what extent relaxation of common knowledge of rationality can rationalize cooperation in the dynamic CAPs.